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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse farmers’ contracting choice in the Hungarian milk
sector, employing transaction cost economics framework.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors focus on some key determinants of farmers’
contracting choices using milk producer survey data. Different semi parametric and semi non
parametric discrete choice models are applied to investigate the type of contracts, duration, number of
contractors, incentives provided in the contract and business history of farmers and buyers.
Findings – Main results confirm that contract-specific investment is a strong predictor explaining
contract choice and contract design. Although trust is an important factor, the authors’ estimations
however report some counterintuitive results. Farm size is also significantly associated with contracts
and contractual arrangements. Vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour also depends on partner
change switching costs and farmers’ bargaining power.
Originality/value – This is a recent study that investigates the role of contracts between producers
and processors, significantly contributing to the limited literature on contractual relationships in
transition agricultures.
Keywords Transaction costs, Contracts, Agriculture, Milk, Milk products, Hungary
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
There is a wealth of literature on the role of contracts in agri-food chains. Most
theoretical and empirical research however focuses on developed countries’ agriculture
(e.g. Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002; Goodhue et al., 2004; Fraser, 2005; Ferna´ndez-Olmos,
2008) whilst studies concentrating on the role of contracts in Eastern European transition
agriculture are limited (Ferto˝, 2009). It is usually assumed, that in transition countries
public institutions are ineffective when it comes to ensuring contract enforcement, while
price systems are generally still inefficient. The absence of enforceable contracts longer
term business relationship between farmers and food processors or retailers has become
extremely difficult. Therefore, finding new long-run partners, for relation-specific
investments has been associated with high transaction costs for market players. In those
sub-sectors where any type of production contracts does exist, agricultural producers
face hold-up problems (e.g. delayed payment for delivered products, or ex post price
reduction by retailers). Although food processors and retailers have significant market
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power, they also struggle to establish long-term relationships with farmers. Given this
legal environment, one should expect that contracting parties would not rely on formal
contracts, but rather to be preferred to oral agreements or spot markets.
The aim of this paper is to identify and explain farmers’ contract choice and
contract design among various supply channels in transition agriculture by examining
the Hungarian dairy sector using survey data. Applying discrete choice models, we
present an empirical analysis of the key determinants of contracting choice based on
transaction cost economics (TCE). The remainder of the study is organised as follows.
The second section briefly reviews the literature on transaction cost economics and its
implications on contracts, while section 3 provides an overview on the Hungarian dairy
sector. Survey design and the variables are described in section 4, while results are
presented in section 5. The last section summarises and offers some conclusions on the
implications for the market mechanisms of Hungary’s milk sector.
2. Transaction costs theory and contracts
The theoretical framework for the analysis of the various aspects of producer – buyer
(processor or retailer) relationships can be divided into two groups. The first approach
is contract theory; the second one is based on the transaction cost economics.
Transaction costs economics (TCE) claims that firm’s vertical boundaries decisions are
determined by characteristics associated with efficiency of the chosen form of
organisation (Williamson, 1985). Williamson (1991) identifies three alternate forms of
transaction governance: market, hybrid and hierarchy. The core prediction of the TCE
is that the governance mode (market, hybrid and hierarchy) that minimises transaction
costs is the preferred option. Transaction costs include the costs of negotiating and
writing contracts and the costs of monitoring and enforcing contractual performance.
The theory focuses on identifying the characteristics of transactions that are best
suited to a particular governance mode. The principal attributes of transactions,
according to TCE are asset specificity (AS), uncertainty (U) and frequency (F).
Together, these three attributes determine the following relationship (Me´nard and
Valceschini, 2005) – signs show the predicted impact of a positive variation of each
characteristic on transaction costs:
TC ¼ f ðAS;F;U Þ ð1Þ
The main general hypotheses of TCE in the relevant empirical literature are the
following. First, as asset specificity increases, hybrids and hierarchies become
preferred over markets. Second, when asset specificity is present to a considerable
degree, uncertainty raises the transaction costs associated with market governance.
Third, when both asset specificity and uncertainty are high, hierarchy is the most
cost-effective governance mode.
The various aspects of contracts, including contract decision, duration and contract
design are also central theme in the TCE (Lyons, 1996). However, the structure of
contractual agreements may vary with the objectives of the contracting parties,
underlying production relations, and the nature and size of informational and strategic
impediments to contract formation and enforcement. As a consequence, the theory
provides no unique structure for the specification and testing of contract design
hypotheses (Masten and Saussier, 2000). But previous theoretical and empirical
research provides some testable hypotheses. Contracts include the costs of writing,
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enforcement, and potential inflexibility, therefore in the absence of sufficient benefits,
these costs may be a deterrent to formal contracting. The main insight of TCE is that
the benefits of writing a contract should depend positively on each trading partners’
vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour. Frequently tested hypotheses on contract
choice in empirical TCE literature are as follows:
H1. The likelihood of formal contracting increases with value of specific
investments.
It should be mentioned however, that writing a formal contract does not depend
exclusively on the asset specificity. Lyons (1994) emphasises some other factors
influencing contract choice, detailed in the following hypotheses:
H2. The size of firms will be positively associated with the propensity to write
formal contracts. Large firms can easier bear the costs of writing a formal
contract, since they can spread the overhead of employing legal specialists.
H3. Trust is negatively associated with the formal contract. The greater the
expectation that trade will continue in the future, the less reliant a contractual
relationship will be on legal enforcement. Non-legal enforcement requires the
incentive of expected future profits. If partners trust each other, there will be
less need to sign a formal contract.
The vulnerability of a trading partner to opportunistic behaviour is closely related to
asset specificity. The exposure of opportunism however, may have some other
dimensions including the partner change switching costs and bargaining power of
players. Thus, we add the following two hypotheses to our analysis:
H4. The likelihood of formal contracting increase with value of switching costs of
trading partner.
H5. The likelihood of formal contracting decreases with level of bargaining
power.
H1 can be extended to the various aspects of contract design including duration, contract
complexity, business history (length of contractual relationships). More specifically we
are interested on the impact of asset specificity on contract design. Thus:
H6. The likelihood of the long-term contractual agreements increases with the
value of relationship-specific investments.
H7. Increasing asset specificity leads to more complex contracts between
partners.
Similarly, we may apply H3-H5 for duration, contract complexity, and business
history:
H8. Higher level of trust is positively associated to long term contracts and
contractual relationships.
H9. The likelihood of complex contracts is decreasing with higher level of trust.
H10. The higher the switching costs, more likely to observe long term contracts
and contractual relationships.
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H11. The higher the switching costs, more likely to observe increasingly complex
contracts.
H12. The higher level of bargaining power, the less likely to observe long term
contracts and contractual relationships.
H13. The higher level of bargaining power, the less likely to observe more complex
contracts.
However, the extension of H2 to contract design is less unambiguous, thus we do not
have a priori expectations.
3. Dairy sector in Hungary
After the fall of the socialist economic system, restructuring process in the Hungarian
dairy sector began. One of the most notable phenomena was an exceptional decrease of
the number of dairy farms. In the 1995-2007 period, the number of dairy farms in
Hungary decreased by 59 per cent leaving approximately 7,500 dairy farms in the
sector. The fall in the number of dairy cows was an immediate consequence. The cow
stock dropped from almost 500,000 in 1992 to 323,000 in 2007. Now, Hungarian raw
milk production amounts to roughly 1.8 billion litres (around 180 litres per capita). In
Hungary, milk is predominantly produced by agricultural enterprises. In 2005 their
share in number of dairy cows accounted for 67 per cent whereas family farms’ share
was 33 per cent. The average herd size in agricultural enterprises was 295 whilst on
individual farms only 6.2.
The transformations in the processing sector during the transition period, lead to a
quick consolidation of the industry. The number of dairy processing companies
decreased from roughly 170 in 1996 to 58 in 2007. As a consequence, the concentration
ratio increased, the C5 index reaching 60 per cent already in 2001, remaining around
this level ever since. Hockmann and Voneki (2009) analyse the possibility of tacit
collusion on the Hungarian raw milk market using a structural equation model. They
find that processors were able to exploit significant oligopsony power, but the
opportunities to benefit from this favourable position have been eroded over time due
to the emergence of alternative marketing channels.
The retail level however, followed a different path than the upstream levels of the
sector. Due to several factors (privatisation, the emergence of multinational retail
chains, high number of small private entrepreneurs) at the beginning of the transition
period, the number of retail units rocketed from 25,000 in 1990 to 60,000 by the end of
the decade. This trend was reversed after 2000 with a fast concentration process (by
the end of 2007 the number of retail units fell back to 45,000), the main actors of the
retail level becoming the super and hypermarkets. Now, the five largest retail
companies account for two-thirds of grocery sales, whilst the ten largest for 90 per cent,
thus Hungary has a relatively high retail concentration amongst the New EU Member
States, being close to the EU average.
4. The sample and key variables
To investigate producers-processors contracting characteristics and to test the
determinants of contracts, a questionnaire was designed and data were collected from
Hungarian milk producers from each county. The aim was to obtain a database so that
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proxy variables could be constructed. The sample of 300 for the postal survey was
selected from the 1,900 members of the Hungarian Dairy Product Council (HDPC)
consisting of 528 joint companies and 1,368 producers delivering directly to processors.
To eliminate extreme values, (too small or too large farms) we exclude the upper and
lower 10 per cent of the sample, based on the quota quantity. On the basis of milk
quota, HDPC’s members own 75 per cent of the total quota quantity. All members have
some kind of contractual relationship(s) with the processors. 68 questionnaires were
correctly filled and processed. The questions were classified into six groups with
special respect to basic data of the farm, characteristics of contract(s) applied,
bargaining power (of the producers), (changes of) relationships with trading partners,
(specific) investments, as well as access to information. The preparation of the survey
was assisted by the HDPC.
The five dependent variables correspond to the five contracting choices analysed in
this study:
D1. Type of contract. The dependent binary variable takes the value of 1 if the
contract is based on written agreement only, and 0 if contract is oral.
D2. Duration of contract. The dependent binary variable takes the value of 1 if the
contract is for more than a year, and 0 if shorter.
D3. Business history. The dependent binary variable takes the value of 1 if the
contractual relationship between farmer and processor is longer than a year
and 0 otherwise.
D4. Incentive is proxy for contractual complexity. This variable reflects the
intentions for contractual safeguard using various incentives. The dependent
binary variable takes the value of 1 if the contractor provides incentives (price
premiums, fodder, cooling equipment, etc.) and 0 otherwise.
D5. Number of contractors. The dependent variable measures the number of
organisations the farmer has contractual relationships with (1, 2 or 3).
To provide consistency of our results we employ the same set of variables for all
aspects of contracting. We focus on two set of variables. First, we assess the
importance of asset specificity, trust and firm size.
Contractinv is a binary variable, measuring asset specificity. Takes the value of 1 if
there have been contractual relation specific investments on the farm (i.e. investments
whose purpose is explicitly is the improvement of market business relationships), and
0 otherwise.
Cownumber measures the size of the farm using the herd size as proxy.
We asked farmers about the reasons for selling milk to a particular buyer. The
respondents evaluated the importance of specific factors, including trust. Level of trust
towards the contractor is ranging values from 1 to 5.
Switching cost (switching) is measured by farmer’s perception on the possibility of
partner change (values from 1 very easy to 5 very difficult)..
Bargaining power (whether the particular farmer can influence the purchase price)
is measured by the variable pinfluence (values from 1 – never to 5 – often).
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Therefore, the theoretical model tested is:
ProbðD1; . . . ;D5Þ ¼ f ðexplanatory variablesÞ
Table I presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables (number of
observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values).
A number of interesting findings are derived from the descriptive statistics.
Contract related variables show the importance of trust (high, above 4 average), 38 per
cent of farms have contract specific investment. The average farm in the sample is
fairly large, with almost 130 cows. Switching costs are rather moderate (3.2), while the
limited possibilities of farmers to influence prices (average 1.5 of maximum 4) imply
considerable bargaining issues.
Table II reveals most contracts being formal, written ones, however the length of
these contracts is mostly for only a year only. The large majority of farmers have only
one contractor at a given time, whilst 16 have two and only 1 has contractual
relationships with three processors. The large proportion of farmers (73 per cent) delivers
milk to the processor. This statistic, combined with the low bargaining power of farmers
may indicate processors’ oligopsony power. The role of incentives is evident, 57 farmers
are taking advantage of buyer provided support. And finally, the frequency of business
history variable emphasises the importance of long-term business relationships.
5. Results
In order to examine the relationships between contract existence and contract design,
we estimated various binary and ordered models. The discrete-choice models are
typically estimated by maximum likelihood, after imposing distributional assumptions
with respect to the error term. Semi parametric literature however emphasise that
parametric estimators of discrete choice models are known to be sensitive to departures
from distributional assumptions. Various estimators have been developed for
correcting this restrictive nature of parametric models. In this paper we apply the
semi-nonparametric approach of Gallant and Nychka (1987) and Stewart (2004) for
ordered models, whilst parametric maximum likelihood approach of Klein and Spady
(1993) for binary models.
Variable No. of Obs. Mean SD Min Max
contractinv 68 0.382 0.489 0 1
cownumber 68 129.602 158.980 6 720
trust 68 4.073 1.374 1 5
switching 68 3.264 1.472 1 5
pinfluence 68 1.411 0.717 1 4
Table I.
Descriptive statistics of
explanatory variables
Value Type of contract Duration Number of contracts Incentive Business history
0 19 54 – 13 12
1 51 16 51 57 58
2 – – 16 – –
3 – – 1 – –
Table II.
Frequency of dependent
variables
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5.1 Type of contract
The estimated coefficients of the semi parametric ML model with respect to the choice
between oral and formal (written) contracts are presented in Table III. All variables are
statistically significant, with an unexpected sign. Confirming H1, contractual asset
specificity (contractinv) has positive impact on formal contract. In relation to H2, the
farm size variable (cownumber), has a significant and positive influence upon formal
contract choice with expected sign, i.e. larger farmers are more likely to choose written
contracts than smaller ones. H3 positing negative relationship between farm size and
formal contract is not supported, trust negatively influences oral contract. We may
argue that written contract requires higher level of trust, while oral contract can be
breached more easily. The switching costs positively influence the formal contract
supporting H4. The significant and negative coefficient of pinfluence confirm H5,
indicating that better bargaining power on influencing prices is negatively associated
with written contracts.
5.2 Duration of contract
The determinants of whether the contract agreement is valid for more than a year are
presented in Table IV. The contract specific investment has no significant impact on
contract duration, thus H6 is not supported. The positive and significant coefficient of
cownumber suggests that larger farms prefer long-term contracts. H8 is not rejected
since trust positively influences the duration of contract. High switching costs have
positive impact on the duration of contract, validating H10. The ability of farmer to
influence purchase prices is more likely with shorter contracts rather than longer ones,
supporting H12.
Variable Coefficient
contractinv 0.199
cownumber 0.014 * *
trust 1.472 * *
switching 0.994 *
bargain 24.617 * *
n 68
Loglikelihood 226.064
Notes: *Significant at 5 per cent; * *Significant at 1 per cent
Table IV.
Semi parametric
maximum likelihood
estimation: duration of
contract
Variable Coefficient
contractinv 2.358 *
cownumber 0.047 *
trust 0.940 *
switching 1.174 *
bargain 27.852 *
n 68
Loglikelihood 229.780
Notes: *Significant at 1 per cent
Table III.
Semi parametric
maximum likelihood
estimation: type of
contract
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5.3 Business history
Table II shows that most farmers have a longer than a year business relationship with
the downstream industry. However, only 30 per cent of have longer term contract. This
implies that longer business relationships are not necessarily contributing to longer
term contracts. Results suggest that contract specific investments positively influence
business history confirming H6 (Table V). Positive and significant coefficient of
cownumber implies that larger farms prefer longer business relationships.
Interestingly, trust and switching costs are insignificant. Our estimations support
H12, bargaining power decreases the length of business history. This indicates that
farmers are easily changing business partners if they think they will be able to
influence purchase prices through new partners and contracts. Note, that significant
variables provide qualitatively the same results as for contract duration.
5.4 Incentive
The role of contract complexity via incentives provided is analysed in the Table VI. All
variables are significant. Confirming H7, asset specificity has positive impact on the
existence of incentives, implying that farmers with contractual specificity need for
safeguard of their investments. Negative and significant coefficient of cownumber
suggests that farmers delivering larger quantities of milk are less likely to be targeted
by the contract specified incentives. Based on the positive and significant coefficient of
trust, we may reject H9. Switching costs have negative impact on contract incentives
thus rejecting H11. Our estimations support H13, bargaining power decreases the
complexity of contract.
Variable Coefficient
contractinv 1.200 *
cownumber 20.003 *
trust 0.358 *
switching 20.186 *
bargain 20.749 *
n 68
Loglikelihood 225.819
Notes: *Significant at 1 per cent
Table VI.
Semi parametric
maximum likelihood
estimation: incentive
Variable Coefficient
contractinv 5.277 *
cownumber 0.009 *
trust 20.045
switching 0.230
bargain 23.841 *
n 68
Loglikelihood 225.968
Notes: *Significant at 1 per cent
Table V.
Semi parametric
maximum likelihood
estimation: business
history
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5.5 Number of contractors
Empirical research usually assumes that contractual relations either are mutually
exclusive between economic agents or focusing only on most important partner.
However, farmers may sell their products to more partners. Table II shows that most
farmers in the sample have one contract at a given time, few have two and only one has
three parallel contracts. Thus, we investigate factors explaining the number of
contracts.
The semi-nonparametric ordered probit model for contract numbers is presented in
Table VII. Positive and significant coefficient of contractinv variable indicates that
contract relating investments strengthen the business relationship between contractor
and farmer, the latter choosing more parallel contracts. Size (cownumber) has negative
sign, suggesting larger farmers make business with only one purchaser/processor
whilst smaller ones can easily have several parallel contracts. Trust has a large
significantly negative coefficient, indicating that if the buyer is trusted, there is no need
for more contracts with other purchasers. Farmers with a low level of trust towards the
downstream markets prefer more than one contract, thus spreading possible contract
or contract enforcement related risks. Switching costs has significantly positive sign,
suggesting that the higher switching costs lead to more contracts. Finally, larger
bargaining power indicates more contracts.
6. Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to identify factors explaining contractual choice and contract
design in Hungarian milk market using transaction costs economics framework.
Despite the considerable concentration of milk processing industry and retail sector
and an inefficient legal environment, the market oriented milk producer prefers formal
contracts with stable long-term business relationships. Our results provide
considerable support to the central hypothesis of the TCE, namely, that contract
specific investment is a strong predictor explaining contract choice and contract
design. Although trust is an important factor; our estimations report some
counterintuitive results. We can argue that written contract and choosing longer
duration of contract assumes a higher level of trust between trading partners, whilst
oral and short-term agreements can be breached easier. Farm size is also significantly
associated to contracts and contractual arrangements. In line with Lyons (1994), we
find that larger farms prefer written contracts. Vulnerability to opportunistic
behaviour also depends on partner change switching costs, and farmers’ bargaining
power. Our results shed some light on the importance of public institutions to provide
Variable Coefficient
contractinv 1.034
cownumber 20.003 * *
trust 20.557 * * *
switching 0.646 * *
bargain 20.183
n 68
Loglikelihood 234.747
Notes: *Significant at 5 per cent; * *Significant at 1 per cent
Table VII.
Semi-nonparametric
estimation: number of
contractors
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appropriate background for private enforcement mechanisms in improving contractual
relationships between producers and processors. Contract provisions including various
incentives may help to reduce the contractual default of trading partners.
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